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Abstract—The increased number of security threats against the
Internet has made communications more vulnerable to attacks.
Despite much research and improvement in network security,
the number of denial of service (DoS) attacks has rapidly grown
in frequency, severity, and sophistication in recent years. Thus,
serious attention needs to be paid to network security. However,
to create a secure network that can stay ahead of all threats,
detection and response features are real challenges. In this paper,
we look at the the interaction between the attacker and the
defender in a Red Team/Blue Team exercise. We also propose a
quantitative decision framework which is able to provide optimal
solutions to defend against well-organized and sophisticated
attacks. A large number of possible scenarios for testing of DoS
defences will be examined through this framework in order to
help experts to improve decisions regarding optimal solutions to
defend against DoS threats.

I. I NTRODUCTION
Recently, denial of service (DoS) attacks have proved to
be the most serious threats to the Internet. As a result, many
defence mechanisms have been developed to ﬁnd them and
ﬁght against them. Based on a report from InformationWeek
magazine, DoS attacks are getting more sophisticated and
increasingly are growing since 2005 [1]. Since attack mechanisms are changing over time, the set of defences should also
be dynamic in their behaviour. Most of the proposed defence
approaches will perform different functions in different environments. Implementing and applying every possible defensive
strategy is not possible and it is difﬁcult to compare different
defensive strategies.
In order to gain a deep understanding of the performance
of a defence mechanism, testing a system against complex
attack scenarios is of paramount importance. By investigating
the interaction between various DoS attacks and defence
systems, we will be able to create a reliable cyber-defence
system that can protect the network against DoS attacks.
However, choosing an effective set of defences and adjusting
their behavioural functions are not simple and consequently,
humans are not individually capable of selecting good choices
when complex trade-offs are involved. Thus, we need a
suitable framework which can provide a reasonable tradeoff between the functional and non-functional properties of
defence mechanisms.
In order to achieve the best observation of the mechanisms’
behaviour, the testing environment has to possess realistic

characteristics of the Internet. This observation leads to control
the functioning of the network continuously and analyse the
possible risks, which can help the network administrators to
collect more knowledge about counteraction and use it for
enhancing the defence system.
The aim of this paper is to provide a framework for
investigation of strong DoS attack strategies and best defensive
solutions against these attacks. In order to achieve the aim, we
ﬁrst need to integrate different attack and defence strategies
into a simulation environment to easily evaluate the interactions. The interaction between attacks and defence strategies
is studied using Red Teaming (RT). RT is a concept that
derives its name from military planning and decision-making.
The Blue Team objectives are to evaluate all security layers
for possible vulnerabilities and provide the system security
in an effective and efﬁcient manner. On the other hand, the
enemies are represented by the Red Team. They try to ﬁnd
security gaps, which have not been considered during system
development. By having a Red Team, the Blue Team can
test and evaluate its reaction against enemies and then it
can measure how the defence mechanisms deal with different
attacks. These exercises provide knowledge about interaction
between participants, which lead to rapid improvement of the
defence quality. Based on the interactions between attacks and
defence mechanisms, different defensive strategies that would
be applicable against attacks can be realized. In this stage,
the computational side of RT will help to ﬁnd the optimal
solutions by investigating a space of possibilities. In this paper,
we focus on RT exercises to show how the evaluation process
was simulated. In particular, we do not present our defence
strategies as optimal solutions comparing to other systems.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II presents the
related work. Section III outlines the simulation environment
used in this research. The experimental setup is described in
section IV. The whole system is evaluated and the results
are explained in Section V. Finally, section VI outlines
conclusions and indicates areas for future work.
II. R ELATED W ORK
DoS attack has been the most devastating Internet security
problem for almost a decade. A distributed denial of service
(DDoS) is a special case of DoS in which the attacker tries

to deploy multiple machines to achieve the goal. In this case,
the service is denied by sending a huge amount of trafﬁc to
the victim in two phases: a deployment phase and an attack
phase [2]. DoS attacks exploit different strategies in order to
deny the service of the victim to its legitimate clients. They
are generally classiﬁed into two broad categories: logic attacks
and ﬂooding attacks. Logic attacks (or protocol attacks) exploit
vulnerabilities in some installed protocols at the victim. Most
of the Internet infrastructure DoS attacks are in this category,
such as DNS cache poisoning attack, Teardrop attack based
on overlapping IP fragments, and injection of false routing
information [3], [4]. On the other hand, ﬂooding attacks are
known as brute force attacks and they perform the attack by
sending a vast amount of trafﬁc to the victim. This trafﬁc is
much higher than what will be seen in logic attacks. Both
ﬂooding and logic attacks exploit direct attack mechanisms to
transmit the attack packets to the victim. TCP ﬂooding, ICMP
Echo ﬂooding, and UDP ﬂooding are the most common direct
ﬂooding attacks [5]. In this paper, our focus is on ﬂooding
attacks.
Defence mechanisms against DoS attacks are generally
classiﬁed into three broad categories: attack prevention, attack
detection, and attack reaction [6]. A good defence system
should have a proper attack detection phase before any reaction. The goal of every attack detection mechanism is to
detect intrusions before any serious damage. A good system
can detect attacks in a short period of time with a low
proportion of false positives. Based on the analysis methods
used by detection mechanisms, there are two broad groups
of detection systems: signature-based detection and anomalybased detection. Anomaly-based detection systems explore
intrusions based on deviations from normal behaviours. On
the other hand, signature-based detection systems can identify
an attack if the monitored trafﬁc matches the attack patterns
(signatures). Therefore, anomaly-based detection systems are
able to detect new or modiﬁed attacks. There are different
methods and techniques involved in anomaly-based detection
systems such as threshold detection, statistical measurement,
rule-based methods, and evolutionary computation methods
[7].
As the Internet is a resource-sharing architecture, a reaction
mechanism should be employed when an attack is underway.
The advantages of having a good reaction technique are saving
the bandwidth and separating the packets belonging to attack
trafﬁc and normal trafﬁc. However, it needs to make sure
that in the ﬁltration phase, only attack trafﬁc is ﬁltered,
and it has no impact on the legitimate trafﬁc [8]. There
are several reaction mechanisms proposed in the literature
such as killing of active network connections, ﬁltering, rate
limiting, reconﬁguration, and source traceback mechanism.
In [9], the effectiveness of rate limiting for mitigating TCPbased ﬂooding DoS attacks is evaluated. According to their
results, this mechanism is a suitable reaction technique against
ﬂooding DoS attacks.
Many Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) have been proposed against DoS attacks in recent years. While the focus

of research in this area was on designing the most effective
solutions, little attention has been paid to evaluate these
solutions. The reason for the lack of study in the evaluation
of the solutions is the complexity of the DoS phenomenon
[10]. However, measuring the capability of an IDS is necessary
since it will enable us to reﬁne the IDS conﬁgurations and
compare different IDSs. It is not a simple process since there
is a need to compare different defence strategies and decide
about the best.
RT has long been a valuable tool for military planning and
decision-making. Nowadays, this technique is used in different
expanded areas for varying purposes such as ﬁnancial markets, air trafﬁc, and politics [11]. Identifying vulnerabilities,
decreasing risks, diagnosing unforeseen consequences, and
overall, a better understanding of operational environment are
some of the beneﬁts of RT, which lead to improved decision
making and effective actions. In order to evaluate the security
of a network from the attackers’ point of view, RT techniques
can be implemented. RT is an ethical hacking process to
test the security of networks by modelling the actions of an
attacker. It is worth noting that RT was introduced as one
of SANSs 20 critical security controls for organizations [12].
There are two participating teams in this process: Red Team
and Blue Team. The interaction of these two teams is similar
to the concepts of methods of understanding competitions such
as game theory or drama theory [11]. Furthermore, in order
to overcome the problem of computational expense in RT
exercises, evolutionary computation techniques can be used.
The most well-known algorithms in this category include
genetic algorithms, genetic programming, and evolutionary
programming [13]. From this category, co-evolutionary algorithm is a powerful tool that involves the simultaneous
evolution of competing species with coupled ﬁtness [14].
Computations in Computational Red Teaming (CRT) play the
decision-making role in a RT exercise, while this process is
done by a human in a traditional RT.
In [15], a cooperative co-evolutionary genetic algorithm is
proposed for network security in a grid computing environment. Each detector collaborates with other detectors from
different species and ﬁnally the optimal detectors for the
target set are selected. Each species contains a collection of
a selected detector and represents only a partial solution. The
experiments are implemented on KDD cup 1999 data. Finally,
the proposed co-evolutionary algorithm showed positive cooperation for converging the results to an optimum solution for
detection of four different DoS attacks.
In a Red Team/Blue Team competition, in which, Red
Team strategies are evolved against Blue Team strategies in
order to ﬁnd optimal solutions for each side, we need a
competitive co-evolutionary algorithm. This method has been
used by a number of research groups for different applications.
In [16], an Automated Co-Evolution (ACE) framework was
used to discover the dynamics of RT in a military context
through simulations. Several evolutionary algorithms such as
Elite Pareto Genetic Algorithm (EPGA) and Strength Pareto
Evolutionary Algorithm Version 2 (SPEA 2) were compared

in this paper. The results from ACE can be used by Blue force
to improve the effectiveness of their tactics.
In [17], a combination of agent-based simulation and evolutionary algorithm was used to design an Automated Red Teaming (ART) framework to study RT scenarios. The framework
was examined in an urban operations scenario [18], and the
results provided strong strategies for each side. For example,
the Blue Team requires effective sensors to track down and
destroy the hidden Red Team forces.
To the best of our knowledge, the research by Mirkovic
et al. [19], is the ﬁrst RT exercise, which included both Red
Team and Blue Team in the scope of DoS defence systems.
There are two security systems developed by the Information
Science Institute (COSSACK [20]) and the UCLA (D-WARD
[21]), which have been evaluated in this experiment. The
researchers of Sandia National Laboratories formed the Red
Team and the Blue Team consisting of researchers of UCLA
and Information Science Institute. The experiments developed
in a real environment during a period of eight months, which
was sponsored by DARPAs Fault Tolerant Program. The
Red Team is trying to change the attack behaviour ranging
from simple to sophisticated in order to stress test the two
deﬁned defence mechanisms. There is a limitation on the Blue
Team since they cannot change the defensive strategy once
the game is started. If both teams were allowed to change
their strategies and modify their initial settings, the results
would have been much more worthwhile [19]. Implementing
a complete interaction of Red Team and Blue Team in a
real environment requires large amounts of time, money, and
resources. However there is a possibility of considering other
testing approaches such as simulation to easily achieve the
repetition of the exercises.
For this purpose, we would need a network simulator,
which can simulate the Internet environment as realistically
as possible. It should be able to simulate a detailed
implementation of different protocols that are employed
in DoS attacks. In order to simulate different strategies,
simulation parameters need to be changed during simulation.
To be able to compare defensive strategies, different attack
detection and response mechanisms should be easily integrated
into the simulator. Finally, it is important for researchers to
have access to the simulator for educational and research
purposes [22], [23]. Considering these requirements, we
identiﬁed the network simulator OMNeT++ as the best choice
for our testing approach. To address the challenging problem
of integration of detection mechanisms into the simulator,
there are two approaches in the literature: DDoSSim [24]
and Gamer et al.’s simulation toolchain for distributed attack
detection [22]. DDoSSim is an extension of discrete event
simulator OMNeT++, which has been developed for the
purpose of investigating attack scenarios and protection
mechanisms. This software simulation tool, however, is not
publicly available. The Gamer et al.’s simulation toolchain
is also based on OMNeT++. To simulate the attack and
defence mechanisms, two extra components are developed.
All of the tools used in the simulation toolchain (INET

framework, ReaSE [25], Distack [26]) are publicly available
as open source software. Usability, simplicity, close to reality,
ﬂexibility, and scalability are the features addressed by this
toolchain [22].

III. S IMULATION E NVIRONMENT
As mentioned before, the experiments in this research are
based on the RT concept. This concept has long been used
for military planning and decision-making. There are basically
two teams involved in RT exercise, which leads to more realistic test scenarios. In our experiments, the Red Team generates
different attack scenarios by varying the characteristics of
the DoS attack such as packet size, attack type, and address
spooﬁng status. On the other hand, the Blue Team applies
some countermeasures such as ﬁltering or rate limiting. The
complex process of interactions between Red Team and Blue
Team in these experiments is achieved through a simulation
environment.
The ﬁrst required package for Internet simulations which
is based on OMNeT++, is INET framework [27]. It provides
models for Internet protocols including UDP, TCP, IP, OSPF,
etc. Furthermore, it provides functionality of Internet end and
intermediate systems through Internet-like entities such as
StandardHost and Router, respectively.
In the next step, attack generation and implementation of
the attack detection method are carried out using ReaSE
and Distack modules. ReaSE, which was ﬁrst introduced by
Gamer and Scharf [25], provides realistic and repeatable Internet simulation scenarios. Their objective was facilitating the
evaluation of Internet-like systems and protocols, especially
with regards to attack detection techniques. ReaSE is able to
generate trafﬁc types such as web, streaming, mail, and ping
trafﬁc. Furthermore, it provides different attack trafﬁc types
including distributed DoS attacks and UDP-based and TCPbased worm propagations.
For development of the anomaly attack detection mechanism, we use the Distack framework, which was ﬁrst introduced by Gamer et al. [26]. For integrating Distack into OMNeT++, the whole framework can be loaded as a shared library
in OMNeT++. The process of attack detection by Distack is
performed on routers. Various light weight modules are used
in Distack to implement the detection and analysis methods.
In order to provide different defensive strategies for the Blue
Team in our experiments, there is a need to coordinate the
detection and remediation mechanisms. Remediation mechanisms are usually activated once a challenge is detected by the
detection component. While the Distack framework is responsible for detection anomalies in the simulated network, the
Ponder2 framework provides remediation of those anomalies
through some policy conﬁgurations [28]. This policy-based
framework facilitates management of defence strategies by
controlling the detection and response mechanisms. Ponder2
was ﬁrst evaluated based on a SSFNet implementation [28]
and then, it was ported into OMNeT++ by Yu et al. [29].

Fig. 2.

Fig. 1. Architecture of simulation environment for Red Team/Blue Team
exercises

Topology speciﬁcation for the case-study

During the simulation time, 34 hosts are randomly selected
to launch the DDoS attacks on the victim server.
B. Attack and Defence Strategies

To speed up the process of the Red Team/Blue Team
exercise, we developed a Simulation Automation component.
In addition to that, a Result Extraction component is also
developed to evaluate the effectiveness of strategies. A combination of Java programming and shell scripting is used to
implement the automation and extraction processes. As shown
in Figure 1, the Simulation Automation and Result Extraction
components are interacting with Ponder2, ReaSE, and Distack
framework to perform the Red Team/Blue Team exercise.
All the attack and defence strategies generations are done
in this stage. Furthermore, the interaction of Red Team and
Blue Team is analysed through some effectiveness parameters,
which are introduced in the system evaluation section.
IV. E XPERIMENT S ETUP
In this section we deﬁne network conﬁgurations in order
to clarify the search spaces for the Red Team and Blue Team.
A. Network Topology
We consider a generic network topology for analysing
DoS/DDoS attacks and their countermeasures as shown in
Figure 2. In the network, we have a set of source hosts
including attackers and legitimate users. Attackers are
ﬂooding a victim host that can be a server, which is providing
some essential services for the legitimate users. In our
simulation, we are using the policy-driven approach proposed
by Yu et al. [29] for attack detection and reaction phases.
An anomaly-based detection mechanism is used with a rate
limiter for the reaction phase in this approach. The enhanced
router in Figure 2 is responsible for data collection and
rate limiting behaviour. The studied simulation consists of
20 subnetworks which are interacting through the enhanced
router. Each subnetwrok consists of several hosts and routers.

We need to generate a comprehensive set of attacks and defence strategies to analyse the behaviour of the system. Several
parameters are involved in each side of the system (attacker
vs. defender). For the attacker side, we mainly consider the
attack packet size; attack type; and address spooﬁng status.
The attacking nodes will be randomly selected. The attack
types considered in our experiments are TCP ﬂood, Ping ﬂood,
and UDP ﬂood. These three types of attacks are the most
popular packet ﬂooding attacks used by DoS attack tools [30].
The attackers usually use IP spooﬁng techniques to hide
their identities on the Internet. They simply forge packets
source addresses with a non-existent computer IP address [31].
This parameter in our experiments is a boolean parameter
which can be activated in the case of IP spooﬁng ﬂooding
attacks.
On the other hand, we deﬁne our defence strategies based
on these three parameters: ﬂow limit rate, link limit rate,
and IP limit rate. The detection and response phases are
controlled by these three parameters. In [32], the authors
integerated several reusable modules into OMNeT++ for
detection of anomalies in the simulated network and as a
complementary work, Schaeffer-Filho et al. [28] implemented
the response phase for remediation of those anomalies. These
two frameworks provide a good protection of a network
by fast detection and efﬁcient reaction. A summary of the
defence process is explained below.
Step 1: The information about the link utilization is
extracted by the link monitor module.
Step 2: If the link utilization is higher than a predeﬁned
threshold, the anomaly detector raises an alarm.
Step 3: The response mechanism (rate limiter) starts
limiting the link capacity with a given link limit rate.

In this stage, the overall impact of the attack is reduced
without knowing the cause of attack.
Step 4: The detector starts investigating the cause of
anomaly and ﬁnding the victim IP address.
Step 5: After a period of time, rate limiter starts limiting
the ﬂows toward the victim with a given IP limit rate.
Step 6: A classiﬁer module identiﬁes the speciﬁc attack
ﬂows and,
Step 7: Finally, the rate limiter starts limiting the detected
attack ﬂows with a given ﬂow limit rate.
In Step 3 and Step 4, the rate limiter will affect both
normal and attack trafﬁc.
V. S YSTEM E VALUATION
In this section, we show selected initial results from a total
of 81 interactions. We have three types of DoS attacks in
our experiments and for each type, the defence strategies are
varying by changing the values of ﬂow limit rate, link limit
rate, and IP limit rate from three levels: Low: 30, Moderate:
60, and High: 90.
Each simulation run was for 300 seconds. All the users
including normal clients and attackers start generating trafﬁc
using a uniform random generator function. Thus, different
sets of trafﬁc are used in the simulations to produce more realistic results. Figure 3 shows the amount of packets per second
on the network link to the victim. It illustrates how a defence
strategy affects the behaviour of overall (benign/malicious)
trafﬁc. A TCP ﬂood attack is shown in Figure 3a while Ping
ﬂood and UDP ﬂood attacks are depicted in Figure 3b, 3c
respectively. The attack is started at approximately 40 seconds,
and then the detector will start generating the alarms to the
rate limiter in order to mitigate the DoS attacks. The results
show that the defence mechanism used in this experiment is
more effective in detecting and ﬁltering TCP ﬂood attacks than
Ping ﬂood and UDP ﬂood attacks. As shown in Figure 3a, the
defence mechanism was able to mitigate the TCP ﬂood attacks
by ﬁltering the malicious trafﬁc. After a period of time, all the
remaining trafﬁc is related to the normal background trafﬁc.
For comparing the effectiveness of attack and defence strategies, there are two parameters measured for each simulation
run. In our Red Team/Blue Team exercise, the Red Team is
trying to maximize the false alarm rate while minimizing the
detection rate. On the other hand, a high detection rate with
an acceptable false alarm rate shows the effectiveness of the
Blue Team. Due to the lack of space, 32 interactions are
listed in Table I. For example in the third row, the defence
strategy selected by the Blue Team (60%, 60%, 90%) against
a TCP ﬂood attack (64, TCP, True) selected by the Red Team,
was able to detect 94.60% of attacks destined for the victim
with 1.93% false alarm rate. This can be compared with the
seventh row of the table in which the Red Team changed its
strategy (64, TCP, False) and the previous Blue strategy is not
the optimal solution. Therefore, the Blue strategy should be
modiﬁed with a better setting to mitigate the Red Team. As

another example to show how the defence response selected
by the Blue Team depends on the attack strategy picked by
the Red Team, a 30%, 60%, 90% Blue strategy was able to
mitigate a 64, Ping, True Red strategy, while it was not very
effective on a Red strategy with a bigger attack packet size
(1000, Ping, True).
All the tested simulations in this section are in the
category of traditional RT exercises. In this category a human
is responsible for checking the testing process, statistics
collection, and result evaluation [19]. As the space of Red
Team and Blue Team strategies grow in size, the searching
process for the optimal solutions becomes impractical. In
order to evolve both Red and Blue strategies in the RT
exercises, co-evolution is a step forward to ﬁnd optimal
solutions [11]. In co-evolutionary algorithms, the ﬁtness
of an individual is measured based on the interaction of
individuals with other individuals [33]. Therefore, the process
of interaction between individuals leads toward ﬁnding
increasingly innovative attack and defence strategies.
VI. C ONCLUSION
This paper has presented the interaction between the
attacker and the defender in a Red Team/Blue Team
exercise. The whole process of testing different strategies
and statistic collection is done using a simulation platform.
The initial results from the simulation showed that one
ﬁxed defence mechanism is not always the optimal solution
for different DoS attack strategies. Based on the presented
results, we conclude that the defence mechanism used in
an environment should be dynamically enhanced based
on the new sophisticated attack strategies and therefore
we need a smarter way of selecting the optimal defensive
solutions for our network. For further research into CRT,
a tighter interaction of Red Team and Blue Team will be
considered using co-evolutionary algorithms. Furthermore,
additional topologies, attacks, and defence mechanisms will
be considered in the future work.
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ﬂow limit rate, link limit rate, IP limit rate

Detection Rate

False Alarm Rate

64, TCP, True

30%, 30%, 60%

93.97%

33.32%

64, TCP, True

30%, 60%, 90%

93.76%

2.20%

64, TCP, True

60%, 60%, 90%

94.60%

1.93%

64, TCP, True

90%, 90%, 60%

94.09%

31.18%

64, TCP, False

30%, 30%, 60%

93.81%

4.63%

64, TCP, False

30%, 60%, 90%

93.60%

4.20%

64, TCP, False

60%, 60%, 90%

93.27%

25.56%

64, TCP, False

90%, 90%, 60%

79.94%

20.05%

1000, TCP, True

30%, 30%, 60%

92.56%

0%

1000, TCP, True

30%, 60%, 90%

93.70%

0%

1000, TCP, True

60%, 60%, 90%

92.57%

0%

1000, TCP, True

90%, 90%, 60%

93.98%

21.04%

1000, TCP, False

30%, 30%, 60%

92.33%

0%

1000, TCP, False

30%, 60%, 90%

93.44%

0%

1000, TCP, False

60%, 60%, 90%

92.60%

0%

1000, TCP, False

90%, 90%, 60%

93.81%

0%

64, Ping, True

30%, 30%, 60%

4.34%

79.14%

64, Ping, True

30%, 60%, 90%

21.47%

6.06%

64, Ping, True

60%, 60%, 90%

13.07%

9.47%

64, Ping, True

90%, 90%, 60%

24.67%

62.39%

1000, Ping, True

30%, 30%, 60%

6.42%

68.45%

1000, Ping, True

30%, 60%, 90%

19.21%

39.83%

1000, Ping, True

60%, 60%, 90%

19.54%

6.76%

1000, Ping, True

90%, 90%, 60%

19.62%

6.29%

64, UDP, True

30%, 30%, 60%

6.36%

21.34%

64, UDP, True

30%, 60%, 90%

46.08%

53.91%

64, UDP, True

60%, 60%, 90%

16.40%

63.97%

64, UDP, True

90%, 90%, 60%

20.90%

67.96%

1000, UDP, True

30%, 30%, 60%

5.30%

57.31%

1000, UDP, True

30%, 60%, 90%

12.41%

10.06%

1000, UDP, True

60%, 60%, 90%

20.31%

15.36%

1000, UDP, True

90%, 90%, 60%

12.77%

46.45%
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